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THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME AND 
FOREIGN INVESTOR RIGHTS: ANOTHER VIEW OF A 
POPULAR STORY 
 
Nicolás M. Perrone* 
 
The international investment regime (IIR) continues to be subject of an 
intense debate. After a first wave of criticism, investment arbitration and 
awards have shown some changes in areas such as transparency and 
deference. However, the calls for reform have not ceased; to the 
contrary, they have exacerbated. Most critical research continues 
denouncing investment arbitration as a way of settling foreign 
investment disputes. Those who defend the IIR in turn claim that the 
use of proportionality can resolve most of the existing concerns in this 
field. 
 This article claims that these views overlook a relevant side of this 
story. Investment arbitration and state authority are the only 
controversial issues for them and not the scope of foreign investor 
rights. The authority of foreign investors and host states, however, varies 
according to the way in which investment tribunals interpret the 
individual rights at stake. Following this legal realist lesson, this article 
proposes that property law and theory can serve to illuminate the 
existing struggle around the IIR. Property is a plural concept which 
specification depends on the comprehensive view that arbitrators follow 
when deciding a dispute. In this regard, this article concludes that our 
understanding of the IIR could benefit from further exploring the 
interpretation of foreign investor rights.    
 
For the economic historian, the key problems are to explain the 
kind of property rights that come to be specified and enforced 
by the state and to explain the effectiveness of enforcement.1  
Douglas North, 1981 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Since the boom of the international investment regime (IIR) in the 1990s, the 
academic debate has looked at this regime from essentially two perspectives. The 
first concentrates on how the IIR protects foreign investors, looking mainly at 
investment arbitration and the role of arbitrators. In 2009, Caron noted that 
                                                 
* PhD, London School of Economics and Political Science. Assistant Professor, Universidad 
Externado de Colombia. I would like to thank Robert Wai for his comments on an earlier 
draft of this article. As always, all errors remain mine only.    
1 Douglas North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: W. W. Norton, 1981), at 
21.  
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‘critiques of legitimacy – at least in legal scholarship – often are directed to 
procedural rather than substantive legitimacy.’2 More recently investment scholars 
have begun to develop a second perspective that focuses on where investment 
arbitrators should draw the line between legitimate and illegitimate host state 
behaviour, relying for this on public law and global administrative law approaches. 
This work has promoted the idea that proportionality can resolve any potential bias 
in investment awards, shifting the debate to the interpretation of the standards of 
review. In light of this development, for Roberts, the standards of review in 
investment treaty arbitration constitute ‘the next battleground.’3 
 This article argues that these two perspectives overlook an important part of the 
story paying only limited attention to foreign investor rights and the control of 
resources. In this part of the story, who interprets is crucial but the essential question 
is not only where investment arbitrators should draw the line between the private 
and the public, but also how they draw this line starting from their interpretation of 
foreign investor rights. In most investment arbitrations, foreign investors assert their 
investment-related rights against host states, and arbitrators are expected to enforce 
the treaty protection of these rights against abusive or arbitrary state measures. Most 
foreign investor rights operate as property rights in the IIR, protecting foreign 
investors against host government interference.4 But this is not their only function. 
Legal realists have shown that property and sovereignty are correlative concepts: 
stronger property rights imply less state sovereignty.5 
 The core of most foreign investment disputes thus refers to an inherent 
distributional tension. A view of the IIR that overlooks the specification of foreign 
investor rights can therefore result in a rather formalist approach to the obligations 
imposed by this regime.6 According to the principles embedded in the IIR, host 
governments need to behave in a non-discriminatory and fair manner, compensating 
foreign investors who suffer an excessive burden for the benefit of the entire host 
                                                 
2 David Caron, ‘Investor State Arbitration: Strategic and tactical perspectives on legitimacy,’ 32 
Suffolk Transnational Law Review 513 (2009), at 514. 
3 Anthea Roberts, ‘The Next Battleground: Standards of review in investment treaty 
arbitration,’ 16 International Council for Commercial Arbitration Congress Series 170 (2011), at 170-80. 
4 Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson, ‘Unbundling Institutions,’ 113(5) Journal of Political 
Economy 949 (2005), at 949-95. 
5 Morris Cohen, ‘Property and Sovereignty,’ 13(8) Cornell Law Quarterly 8 (1927-1928), at 8-14; 
21-30; Joseph Singer, ‘Sovereignty and Property,’ 6(1) Northwestern University Law Review (1991), 
at 1-56. 
6 See Philip Allot, ‘State Responsibility and the Unmaking of International Law,’ 29(1) Harvard 
International Law Journal 1 (1988), at 12. 
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community. However, as Waldron has shown in his Hamlyn Lecture, a central 
question in any takings case refers to the scope of the rights.7 In Lucas v South 
Carolina Coastal Council (1992), for instance, the U.S. Supreme Court had to decide 
whether Mr. Lucas’s rights included an entitlement to build on his land (or an 
investment-backed expectation in the language of the court). This question made a 
very important difference in the outcome of the dispute, and ultimately, in South 
Carolina’s authority on coastal matters.  
 Against this background, this article aims to bring attention to foreign investor 
rights and their interpretation. It argues that investment arbitrators specify the scope 
of foreign investor rights in ways similar to the specification of private property 
rights in any constitutional jurisdiction. The IIR operates as a constitutional property 
system by granting foreign investors the possibility to assert their rights as trumps 
against host state authority when they consider that host states have gone too far 
affecting their control of resources. But the resolution of these disputes is never easy 
because property rights are not absolute, and host states always maintain certain 
authority over the given resources. The lack of regulations prohibiting building, as in 
the Lucas case, does not mean that the individual has a right to build despite future 
changes in the legal order. First, retroactivity in this context is of little if any use.8 
Second, investment treaties, as any constitutional property clauses, say barely 
anything about the scope of foreign investor rights, and the applicable legal orders 
only provide an incomplete definition of ownership.  
 Thus, investment arbitrators need to engage in the difficult task of interpreting 
foreign investor rights. Arbitrators have a hard time deciding, for instance, whether 
Philip Morris has a legal right to use its brands in the packaging of its products 
despite the new laws passed in Australia or Uruguay. Private property rights are a 
keystone of any liberal legal order.9 But their scope and meaning remains open to 
contestation. The centrality of property does not change the fact that diametrically 
opposed ideas about property, such as Locke’s contractualist theory or Duguit’s 
social function of property, continue to have a strong influence on most legal orders. 
International treaties and contracts can and do serve to clarify the scope of property 
rights, e.g. regarding the ability to transfer the resources abroad, but these 
                                                 
7 Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law and the Measure of Property (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), at 1-4. 
8 Ibid., at 83-4. 
9 Carol Rose, ‘Property as the Keystone Right?,’ 71(3) Notre Dame Law Review 329 (1996), at 
329-66. 
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commitments neither modify nor remove the prevailing plural and political character 
of property rights.10 
 This article is organised as follows. The second section shows that most academic 
work has concentrated on the IIR as a legal regime aimed to protect foreign 
investment, overlooking the importance of the scope of foreign investor rights. The 
following section demonstrates that these rights are essential to foreign investor 
control of resources and, more generally, to the expansion of foreign investment. 
The fourth section argues that most foreign investor rights have a proprietary 
character since they refer to a measure of control over the resources comprising the 
investment. It shows that the scope of these rights is nevertheless inherently 
incomplete remaining disputable or even disputed. The fifth section claims that this 
account is applicable to the IIR. It explains that the doctrines of acquired rights and 
legitimate expectations are interpretative formulas that serve to specify foreign 
investor rights. The sixth section, borrowing from constitutional property 
scholarship, claims that to understand how investment arbitrators specify foreign 
investor rights, and hence resolve an important part of most investment disputes, it 
is necessary to concentrate on the normativity that guides the interpretation, in 
particular, as arbitrators rely on the doctrine of legitimate expectations. This article 
concludes by suggesting that property law and theory can help to broaden our 
understanding of the kind of property rights that come to be specified and enforced 
according to the IIR. This could open a space for debate and change in times when 
the future of the IIR is under increasing scrutiny. 
 
II. The International Investment Regime as the Law of Foreign Investment 
Protection 
 
The simple idea behind the IIR is that foreign investment requires protection against 
host state actions, and that investment treaties provide this protection. The discourse 
of the World Bank, for instance, has consistently focused on the need to protect 
investments and investors.11 In a publication dedicated to investment law reform, the 
World Bank advises: 
 
                                                 
10 See C. B. Macpherson, ‘The meaning of property,’ in C. B. Macpherson (Edit.), Property, 
mainstream and critical positions (Toronto : University of Toronto Press, 1978), at 1-14. 
11 Antonio Parra, The History of ICSID (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), at 22-5.  
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 If a country wants to attract significant levels of private investment and 
promote itself as a good place to do business, it must protect investments 
and investors in terms of the acquisition, management, conduct, operation, 
and sale or other disposition of the investments in the host country. This 
chapter reviews the fundamental guarantees that investors seek and that, over 
time, have become synonymous with a good, open, modern investment 
policy, and thus investment legislation. It should be noted from the outset 
that all the obligations below are usually also included in a BIT [bilateral 
investment treaty] or other international agreement and any violation could 
lead to the activation of the dispute settlement mechanism in such 
agreements.12 
 
 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has also 
shown a recurring interest in promoting the protection of foreign investment, which 
dates back long before the unsuccessful negotiation of the Multilateral Investment 
Agreement in 1998. In the foreword to the well-known commentary on the 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals 
of Other States (The ICSID Convention), Lauterpacht explains that this Convention, 
sponsored by the World Bank, 
 
carried forward a more general [initiative] for the protection of international 
investment that had begun in the Organisation for European Economic Co-
operation (now the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development) in the late 1950s and that ended in the production in 1962 of 
the OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property.13 
 
During the 1960s, as Lauterpacht notes, there was a lively debate regarding the 
conclusion of a multilateral treaty for the protection of foreign investment. The draft 
of the OECD was an effort in this direction that was, however, never implemented. 
Describing this negotiation process, Fatouros tells us that ‘[t]he proponents of an 
                                                 
12 World Bank, Investment Law Reform. A Handbook for Development Practitioners (Washington D.C.: 
Investment Climate Advisory Services of the World Bank Group, 2010), at 38.  
13 Elihu Lauterpacht, ‘Foreword,’ in Christoph Schreuer, Loretta Malintoppi, August Reinisch 
and Anthony Sinclair, The ICSID Convention: A commentary, Second Edition (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), at ix. 
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investment code point[ed] out that [this initiative was] the simplest as well as the 
most effective means to assure the protection of private foreign investment.’14 
 In the meanwhile, the United Nations was following a quite different approach 
focussing on a code of conduct for multinational corporations. The philosophy 
behind this initiative was quite at odds with the view of the World Bank and the 
OECD. The premise was that foreign investment presented several threats to host 
countries, and multinational corporations required to be regulated at international 
level. This project never achieved any legal status. In the 1990s, it was eventually 
discontinued and the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations 
dissolved and merged into the United Nations Conference for Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD). Almost immediately, UNCTAD adopted a position 
similar to the World Bank and the OECD, promoting investment protection and the 
signature of BITs as a sound policy for development.15 
 During the 1990s, the World Bank, the OECD and UNCTAD had a shared view 
regarding the need of promoting foreign investment protection, and this goal 
became the central objective of the IIR with the signature of thousands of BITs.16 As 
Lester notes, ‘the formal statements of [the IIR’s] purpose often focus on the 
‘protection’ of foreign investments, generally from bad treatment by foreign 
governments.’17 Investment protection even eclipsed other potential goals within a 
free market agenda, such as the liberalisation of multinational corporate activities.18 
The literature shows that the free movement of capital was never a major objective 
of the IIR. Vandevelde points out that ‘BITs do not leave to the market the task of 
allocating international investment resources.’19 In the same way, comparing the 
international trade and investment regimes, Pauwelyn and DiMascio note that 
 
  [a]lthough they share a common origin (treatment of aliens), trade and 
investment disciplines have traditionally focused on different but 
                                                 
14 Arghyrios Fatouros, ‘An International Code to Protect Private Investment-Proposals and 
Perspectives,’ 14(1) The University of Toronto Law Journal 77 (1961), at 99.  
15 See Tagi Sagafi-nejad and John Dunning, The UN and Transnational Corporations: From code of 
conduct to global compact (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), at 138-40. 
16 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2013: Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for 
Development (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 2013), at xix-xx. 
17 Simon Lester, ‘Liberalization or Litigation? Time to Rethink the International Investment 
Regime,’ CATO Institute, Policy Analysis No. 730, 8 July 2013, at 8. 
18 Ibid, at 2. 
19 Kenneth Vandevelde, ‘The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties,’ 41 Harvard 
International Law Journal 469 (2000), at 498. 
7 
 
complementary objectives: liberalisation of trade flows, in the case of trade, 
and protection and promotion of investment, in the case of investment.20   
 
This has not changed even after the convergence of the liberalisation of trade and 
investment with investment protection in most free trade agreements. Investment 
liberalisation and protection remain divorced in most of the literature.21 
 This approach is reflected in the opening pages of Dolzer and Schreuer’s Principles 
of international investment law,22 and is summarized well in the following passage from 
Thomas Wälde’s Separate Opinion in International Thunderbird v Mexico: ‘International 
investment law is aimed at promoting foreign investment by providing effective 
protection to foreign investors exposed to the political and regulatory risk of a 
foreign country.’23 Most commentators concur with this view and see the protection 
of foreign investment against host state actions as constituting the object of 
investment treaties. This is the opinion of Salacuse,24 Vandevelde, 25 Alvarez,26 Lowe27 
and McLachlan.28 It is also consistent with the work of Paulsson, one of the most 
influential arbitrators, who claims in his book Denial of Justice in International Law that 
the objective of the regime is the ‘protection of property rights.’29  
 What transpires from the initiatives of international institutions, the treaties, and 
the corresponding scholarship is that the mission of the IIR is the protection of 
foreign investment against host state actions. Or in other words, some host state 
actions are the problem, and international protection is the solution. The entire 
intellectual edifice built around the IIR appears to be inspired by the idea of 
                                                 
20 Nicholas DiMascio and Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment 
Treaties: Worlds apart or two sides of the same coin?,’ 102 The American Journal of International 
Law 48 (2008), at 53-4.  
21 See Louis Wells, ‘The Emerging Global Regime for Investment: A response,’ 52 Harvard 
International Law Journal 42 (2010), at 44-6. 
22 Rudolph Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), at 3-7. 
23 International Thunderbird v Mexico, NAFTA - UNCITRAL, Thomas Wälde’s Separate Opinion, 
1 December 2005, at 4. 
24 Jeswald Salacuse, ‘The Treatification of International Investment Law,’ 13 Law and Business 
Review of the Americas 155 (2007), at 155. 
25 Kenneth Vandevelde, above n 19, at 489, 492. 
26 José Alvarez, ‘A BIT on Custom,’ 42 International Law and Politics 17 (2009), at 43. 
27 Vaughan Lowe, ‘Changing Dimensions of International Investment Law,’ University of 
Oxford, Faculty of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No 4/2007, at 1, 
10. 
28 Campbell McLachlan, ‘Investment Treaties and General International Law,’ 57 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 361 (2008), at 372. 
29 Jan Paulsson, Denial of Justice in International Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), at 232. 
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protection against host state arbitrary and abusive behaviour. The investment law 
literature, for instance, looks at foreign investor rights as a right to protection or to 
the enforcement of the standards of protection included in investment treaties.30 As 
Wälde notes, ‘investment protection and arbitral jurisdiction constitute a way to 
make rights effective, to enforce them.’31 
 The emphasis on foreign investment protection is also present in institutional 
analyses of the IIR. The premise of these studies is that this regime serves to enforce 
the protection of foreign investment when domestic institutions, in particular the 
judiciary, do not guarantee this enforcement.32 In a very influential article, Guzman 
claims that BITs ‘have become the dominant international vehicle through which 
North-South investment is protected from host country behavior.’33 A second 
related article that Guzman wrote with Elkins and Simmons presents the IIR as an 
instrument for making commitments credible. In their view, investment treaties 
constitute an ‘external commitment mechanism.’34 Ginsburg pursues a similar line of 
argument, his work being ‘primarily concerned with one increasingly popular form of 
international alternative to domestic institutional protection, the Bilateral Investment 
Treaty (BIT).’35 For him, investment treaties are an international institution to 
‘enforce promises.’36 As we can see, the dominant institutional view is based on the 
premise that the IIR is a regime for foreign investment protection.37 For these 
commentators, the core of this regime is an alternative mechanism of enforcement – 
investment arbitration – that makes allegedly uncertain commitments credible.  
                                                 
30 See Tillmann Braun, ‘Globalization-driven Innovation: The Investor as a Partial Subject in 
Public International Law – An Inquiry into the Nature and Limits of Investor Rights –,’ Jean 
Monnet Working Paper 04/13, NYU School of Law, 2013; Zachary Douglas, ‘The Hybrid 
Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration,’ 74 British Yearbook of International Law 151 
(2003), at 162-64; Campbell McLachlan, above n 28, at 384. 
31 Thomas Wälde, ‘The Specific Nature of Investment Arbitration,’ in Philippe Kahn & 
Thomas Wälde (Ed.), Les Aspects Nouveaux du Droit des Investissements Internationaux/New Aspects 
Of International Investment Law (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007), at 56. 
32 Vaughan Lowe, above n 27, at 51-2.  
33 Andrew Guzman,  ‘Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the popularity of 
bilateral investment treaties,’ 38 Virginia Journal of International Law 639 (1998), at 687. 
34 Zachary Elkins, Andrew Guzman and Beth Simmons, ‘Competing for Capital: The 
Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000,’ 60 International Organization 811 (2006), 
at 834. 
35 Tom Ginsburg, ‘International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: Bilateral Investment 
Treaties and Governance,’ 25 International Review of Law and Economics 107 (2005), at 107. 
36 Ibid. 
37 See also Anne Van Aaken, ‘International Investment Law between Commitment and 
Flexibility: A contract theory analysis,’ 12 Journal of International Economic Law 507 (2009), at 
507-538.  
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 The academic characterisation of the IIR is similarly based on foreign investment 
protection, with investment arbitration as the dominant element. The initial 
approach to investment arbitration was to liken it to private international law and 
commercial arbitration.38 This view suffered an important backlash during the mid-
2000s and has now lost support. The second approach, which remains dominant, 
describes the IIR as a mechanism of judicial review. This view emphasizes the public 
impact of the enforcement of foreign investment protection but does not move the 
focus away from protection against host state actions. Van Harten and Loughlin, for 
instance, argue that ‘[t]he effect of this combination of features, uniquely present in 
investment arbitration, is to subject the regulatory conduct of states to control 
through compulsory international adjudication to an unusual extent.’39 Several others 
have characterized the IIR as a form of judicial review, concentrating on the 
implications behind the enforcement of foreign investment protection. The most 
important examples are probably Kingsbury and Schill,40 Montt41 and Ortino.42 
 In spite of the large consensus that protection from host state behaviour is the 
leitmotiv of the IIR, there is a perhaps additional question that has created some 
debate in the literature. This is whether the establishment of a legal mechanism for 
foreign investment protection is an end in itself or whether there is a higher objective 
beyond the protection of foreign investment. Salacuse and Sullivan admit that the 
primary goal of home states with investment treaties was the ‘protection of 
investments made by their nationals and companies in foreign countries.’43 They 
argue, however, that the IIR advances a more complex purpose: investment treaties 
represent a ‘Grand Bargain’ according to which host states make ‘a promise of 
                                                 
38 Gus Van Harten, Investment treaty arbitration and public law (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), at 121-180; Anthea Roberts, ‘Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping 
the Investment Treaty System,’ 107(1) The American Journal of International Law 45 (2013), at 54.  
39 Gus Van Harten and Martin Loughlin, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global 
Administrative Law,’ 17(1) European Journal of International Law 121 (2006), at 122. 
40 Benedict Kingsbury and Stephan Schill, ‘Investor-State Arbitration as Governance: Fair and 
Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global Administrative Law,’ New 
York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper 146 (2009). 
41 Santiago Montt, State Liability in Investment Treaty Arbitration: global constitutional and 
administrative law in the BIT generation (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2009). 
42 Federico Ortino, ‘The Investment Treaty System as Judicial Review: Some Remarks on its 
Nature, Scope and Standards,’ 24(3) The American Review of International Arbitration 437 (2013), at 
437-468. 
43 Jeswald Salacuse and Nicholas Sullivan, ‘Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain,’ 46 Harvard International Law Journal 67 (2005), 
at 76. 
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protection of capital in return for the prospect of more capital in the future.’44 
Similarly, Roberts asserts that the text of the treaties that make up the IIR  
 
often provides little help given continuing debates over whether such treaties 
exist to protect investors and investments (which might suggest that 
ambiguities should be resolved in favor of investors) or to promote public 
welfare by increasing foreign investment (which might require investment 
protections to be weighed against other policy goals).45  
 
 Interestingly, this debate regarding the final end of investment protection shifts the 
perspective away from foreign investors, who enjoy treaty protection, and back to 
host states. For most of the literature, the potential benefits that would follow from 
an increase in foreign investment in host countries justify investment protection.46 
Host states are in this way presented as the ultimate beneficiary of investment 
protection, turning foreign investment into a means to host state development. I 
would like to contradict this, at least partially, because protection can easily be seen 
as a means to the fulfilment of foreign investor ultimate goal: i.e. the maximisation of 
their benefits. As Akinsanya notes, ‘[p]rivate investors invest to make profits and not 
for reasons of benevolence.’47 The problem of the view that sees the ultimate goal of 
the IIR only in host state development is not that foreign investment cannot have 
positive developmental consequences, but rather that it overlooks foreign investor 
interests in the IIR. The possibility to launch an investment arbitration is central to 
remain in control of the ‘economic viability of the investment.’48 But it is only 
relevant to the extent that the scope of the rights is aligned to foreign investor 
expectations or, returning to the words of the World Bank, to the ‘acquisition, 
management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of the investments in 
the host country.’49 
 
                                                 
44 Ibid, at 77.  
45 Anthea Roberts, above n 38, at 51.  
46 See Karl Sauvant and Lisa Sachs (Eds.), The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: 
Bilateral investment treaties, double taxation treaties, and investment flows (New York: Oxford 
University Press), 2009. 
47 Akinsanya, Adeoye, ‘International Protection of Direct Foreign Investments in the Third 
World,’ 36 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 58 (1987), at 58. 
48 Burlington v Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on Liability, 14 December 2012, 
para 397. 
49 See above n 12. 
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III. The International Investment Regime and the Control of Resources 
 
Foreign investors have good reasons to be concerned about the control of resources 
comprising foreign investments. Host states are among their main rivals. These two 
actors can behave in a non-adversarial and cooperative way but they can also struggle 
to control the resources and appropriate the benefits of any given economic 
activity.50 An essential feature of this struggle is that host states can affect the control 
of resources in ways nobody else can. States have the authority to modify the laws 
and regulations that govern the resources, such as taxation rules.51 Before the Second 
World War, foreign investors relied on their home states for ensuring their control of 
resources. This was possible because their political and economic interests were 
substantially aligned. In 1935, Staley described a world where ‘diplomacy serve[d] 
investments’ and ‘investments serve[d] diplomacy.’52 Diplomatic protection worked 
acceptably in this context in spite of the legal fiction that informs this model. The 
fiction is that foreign investors own the right and effectively manage the resources, 
but do not control the international-based remedy against host state abuse or 
arbitrary behaviour.53 Foreign investors acquire and decide the use of the resources 
comprising an investment, and home states are expected not to interfere with their 
private authority. However, only home states can launch a case against host states. 
As Brownlie has explained, ‘the subject matter of the claim is the individual and his 
property: the claim is that of the state.’54 
 Diplomatic protection proved ill-suited to the challenges posed by the post-colonial 
world.55 The period between 1950s and 1970s were times in which foreign investor 
control was under the threat of decolonisation and of state interference in the wake 
                                                 
50 Peter Dicken, ‘The Roepke Lecture in Economic Geography Global-Local Tensions: Firms 
and states in the global space-economy,’ 70 Economic Geography 101 (1994), at 101-28.  
51 Thomas Andersson, Multinational Investment in Developing Countries: A study of taxation and 
nationalization (Routledge, New York, 1991), at 23-49.  
52 Eugene Staley, War and The Private Investor: A Study in the Relations of International Politics and 
International Private Investment (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, 1935), Chapters 3; 6. 
53 Peter Muchlinski, ‘The Diplomatic Protection of Foreign Investors: A tale of judicial 
caution,’ in Christina Binder, Ursula Kriebaum, August Reinisch and Stephan Wittich (Eds.), 
International Investment Law for the 21st Century Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), at 343; Francisco Orrego Vicuña, ‘Changing Approaches to 
the Nationality of Claims in the context of Diplomatic Protection and International Dispute 
Settlement,’ in Ibrahim Shihata; Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte and Keyong Dong (Eds.), Liber 
amicorum Ibrahim F. I. Shihata: International finance and development law (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2001), at 503-504.  
54 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, Sixth Edition (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), at 459. 
55 Antonio Parra, above n 11, at 11. 
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of global corporate expansion. First, many new states perceived multinational 
corporations as agents of the former colonial powers and a source of continuing 
foreign domination.56 Private foreign investors needed to convince host states that 
they were not part of the old model, and the idea of requesting diplomatic protection 
from home states was not compatible with this. International business needed to 
become a ‘stateless’ sector.57 Second, the interests of multinational corporations 
started to diverge from those of home states. The world of global value chains and 
economic globalisation that Reich, and Stopford and Strange describe as a 
consolidated trend in the 1990s contrasts with the picture provided by Staley back in 
1935.58 In the 1960s and 1970s, scholars began to note that when firms look for 
diplomatic intervention and protection, home governments demanded costly 
concessions. These could be modifications to business strategies that favour host 
states, e.g. more exports from the home nation or less relocation to the host 
country.59 State intervention in the economy became more frequent than in the past, 
and the diplomatic protection model thus presented foreign investors with the 
dilemma of choosing between home or host state intervention in the control of 
resources. 
 These circumstances produced an international business voice particularly 
interested in campaigning for an individual-based regime to ensure foreign investor 
control of resources. Bankers, executives and lawyers came up with several ideas in 
the 1950s to replace diplomatic protection with a model more attuned to the 
interests of the international business sector.60 Rather than ‘stateless’ corporations, 
these non-governmental initiatives involved creating an international code and an 
international dispute settlement forum. There were three important private 
                                                 
56 Fred Bergsten, Thomas Horst and Theodore H Moran, American multinationals and American 
interests (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978), at 314-329.  
57 George Ball,  ‘Cosmocorp: the Importance of Being Stateless,’ 2 Columbia Journal of World 
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proposals: The 1949 International Chamber of Commerce International Code for 
Fair Treatment of Foreign Investment (state-to-state arbitration, Article 13), The 
1948 International Law Association Draft Statutes of the Arbitral Tribunal for 
Foreign Investment and the Foreign Investment Court (foreign investor-state 
arbitration, Article 3), and The 1959 Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention (foreign 
investor-state arbitration, Article VII). In one way or another, these initiatives were 
aimed at detaching foreign investors from the strings of home states through either 
state-to-state or foreign investor-state arbitration, increasing their control of the 
resources comprising investments. 
 The concrete outcome of foreign investor lobbying was, in the end, two less 
comprehensive efforts that materialized in 1959 and 1965: the signature of the first 
BIT between Germany and Pakistan, and the conclusion of the ICSID Convention. 
These initiatives constitute the basis of the IIR in terms of the structure of this 
regime and, perhaps more importantly, when it comes to the views regarding foreign 
investment protection as a means to development. In this respect, many authors 
found a connection between development and the ICSID Convention.61 Something 
similar occurs with BITs. These treaties are the outcome of a much broader proposal 
for a ‘Magna Carta for Private Foreign Investors’ made by Abs in 1957 at a 
Conference in San Francisco.62 Abs took that opportunity to raise a point made 
earlier by other commentators, such as Coudert and Lans in 1946.63 According to 
these authors, developing states would not attract enough private foreign investment 
to advance their development process unless they implemented mechanisms that 
ensured the protection of foreign investor property rights. 
 These claims are still open to debate as there is contradicting evidence on the 
effects of investment treaties on foreign investment flows, and on the importance of 
foreign investment for development.64 On the other hand, the significance of these 
legal rules for foreign investors cannot be contested. Foreign investors were not 
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going to expand and enjoy the profits of the increasing business opportunities in 
developing countries unless they acquired the legal means to gain and maintain the 
control of resources.65 A historical account of the origins of the IIR where private 
foreign investors demand certain private property rights as preconditions to carry out 
their investments is consistent with the dominant view in economic history, 
economics and the economic sociology of law. In his neoclassical theory of the state, 
North explains that to facilitate private economic activity, states need to ‘specify and 
enforce property rights.’66 The correct fulfilment of this task would lead to private 
business and economic growth.67 Likewise, Olstrom and Schlager consider that 
individuals require a sufficient level of control over resources to conduct their 
economic activities.68 A similar conclusion emerges in Max Weber’s work on the role 
of law in the rise of capitalism.69 If the promotion of foreign private investment is in 
some sense to be equated with the expansion of capitalism beyond national borders, 
the legal order needs to give foreign investors a mechanism to make economic life 
more calculable.70 The expansion of global capitalism requires the law to provide 
calculability for economic actors regarding their control of resources, which, in turn, 
implies the specification and enforcement of foreign investor rights.  
 
IV. The Analytical Dimension of Foreign Investor Rights 
 
The analytical dimension of foreign investor rights confirms the relevance of control 
in foreign investment relations, and sets the basis for understanding the specification 
of these rights in the context of investment disputes. The property character of 
foreign investor rights may appear ambiguous at first because, according to the text 
of investment treaties, assets are the minimum denominator of a foreign investment, 
not property rights. However, although the concept of assets has no precise legal 
meaning, its lay definition refers to resources, suggesting that most of the assets 
                                                 
65 Charles Lipson, above n 59, at 4. 
66 Douglas North, above n 1, at 21. 
67 Ibid.  
68 Elinor Olstrom and Edella Schlager, ‘The Formation of Property Rights,’ in Susan Hanna, 
Carl Folke and Karl-Göran Mäler (Eds.), Rights to Nature: ecological, economic, cultural, and political 
principles of institutions for the environment (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1996), at 137. 
69 Max Weber, Economy and Society, Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Eds.), (New York: 
Bedminster Press, 1968), Volume 1, at 68. Cited by Trubek, David, ‘Max Weber on Law and 
The Rise of Capitalism,’ Wisconsin Law Review 720 (1972), at 742. 
70 See Richard Swedberg, ‘Max Weber's Contribution to the Economic Sociology of Law,’ 
CSES Working Paper Series Paper # 31, revised February 2006. 
15 
 
enumerated in investment treaties represent foreign investor interests over 
resources.71 Leaving aside typical contractual rights, such as debts and the use of 
umbrella clauses to enforce typical contractual rights, most of the rights included in 
investment treaties have a property character.72 They either grant legal control over a 
resource, such as a property title over land, or modify or clarify the measure of legal 
control over resources, e.g. providing exceptions to the general framework applicable 
to a certain activity.73 The tribunal in Methanex v United States (2005) emphasizes the 
importance of control in modern investment disputes as it notes that a ‘restrictive 
notion of property as a material ‘thing’ is obsolete and has ceded its place to a 
contemporary conception which includes managerial control over components of a 
process that is wealth producing.’74 
 Some of the assets listed in investment treaties are typical property rights, such as 
enterprises, shares, intellectual property rights, and ‘other tangible or intangible, 
movable or immovable property, and related property rights, such as leases, 
mortgages, liens, and pledges.’75 Other assets enumerated in the treaties take the 
form of vested rights, which also have a clear proprietary character. The list of vested 
rights contained in investment agreements is comprehensive, including ‘licenses, 
authorizations, permits, and similar rights conferred pursuant to domestic law.’76 
These rights are intrinsically connected to the control of resources as they serve to 
clarify the extent of private control over resources.77 In this respect, investment 
tribunals have considered that intangible rights, such as rights under a licence, are 
included in the notion of investment and therefore subject to protection according 
to investment treaties.78 
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 The assets that are more difficult to categorize are concessions, which are 
sometimes described as contracts. According to the analysis of UNCTAD, for 
instance, business concessions are ‘rights conferred by law or under contracts.’79 
Concessions are different from typical property rights because they are more 
complex sets of rights that often include proprietary rights and contractual 
commitments. A concession allocates resources, such as a mine or an oil field, to 
individuals but with more detailed ownership terms than in the case of typical private 
property rights. Normally, the most important condition is that the resources should 
be used for the particular purpose defined in the concession, such as the production 
of minerals or oil. In addition, while the time span for private property is normally 
unlimited, concessions tend to have a fixed duration.80 Now, although concessions 
may include contractual commitments, such as a tax stabilisation clause, their main 
purpose is to grant foreign investors a certain measure of control over specific 
resources. The tax stabilisation clause serves to expand foreign investor control over 
the resources, e.g. limiting host state tax authority.81 As Douglas explains, then, ‘it is 
clear that ‘contractual rights’ in this context should be interpreted narrowly as those 
contracts that regulate the investor’s rights to property in the host state.’82 
 The premise that foreign investor rights have a property character is quite 
important as it confirms that they govern the use of the resources comprising the 
foreign investment. In his book The Idea of Property, Penner argues that the most 
important function of property is precisely to determine how resources ‘will be 
used.’83 Property scholars normally refer to this through the concept of ownership. 
Waldron explains that the concept of ownership describes ‘a correlation between 
individual names and particular objects, such that the decision […] about what 
should be done with an object is taken as socially conclusive.’84 The concept of 
ownership is central to understanding the use of resources as it specifies the ability of 
the individual owner to choose between a range of uses (e.g. to operate a waste 
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disposal unit), and the right to enjoy a number of entitlements (e.g. the right to 
income).85 
 Although the principle of a private property system is that individuals control the 
initiative over resources, states have the authority to block or limit some of their 
plans. In this regard, Katz describes ownership as the ability to ‘set the overall 
agenda’ for resources.86 She explains that states can regulate property by narrowing 
or expanding these potential agendas, but they cannot block the ability of owners to 
exercise their ‘parallel agenda-setting authority.’87 This distribution of authority can 
constitute a source of tension between private and public actors. 
 Private-public disputes regarding the use of the resources can be particularly 
complex because legal orders rarely define the scope of ownership in a 
comprehensive and detailed manner. The problem is that ownership derives from a 
‘system of pre-established rights, which are disputable or even disputed.’88 The 
incomplete character of ownership contrasts with the ideal Coasian world of well-
defined property rights.89 However, economists such as Barrère and Libecap 
acknowledge that legal orders cannot define ownership comprehensively,90 and, 
Coase himself disagreed with the formulation of the Coase’s theorem and the 
hypothesis of zero or very low transaction costs.91 Thus, the issue is not that states 
have taken a normative decision in favour of increasing transaction costs or not 
protecting property rights adequately. Rather, legal orders cannot define all the 
potential uses of a resource in advance. History is full of examples where resources 
that were once of little interest, such as oil, became increasingly valuable.92 As 
Waldron affirms, 
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what markets can and cannot produce, how efficiently they are producing it 
(or what social goals they promote or retard in various circumstances) are not 
always calculable a priori. This too varies over time and with circumstances in 
face of social, economic, ecological, and demographic change.93 
  
 The fact that ownership is incomplete does not imply, nor should it be read as 
implying, that the text of the law does not matter. When enforcing private property 
or foreign investor rights, the job of judges and arbitrators begins with either the 
constitutional or the treaty text. As Alexander highlights, ‘[j]udicial interpretation of a 
constitutional property clause turns on many factors, among which is its text.’94 
Essentially, these clauses describe the same problem, provide the same solution and 
omit the same information. They describe the problem of abusive state behaviour 
directed at depriving individuals of their private property or investment, imposing 
the solution of paying compensation. The similarity in the structure of these clauses 
extends to what they omit: the scope of the rights in question. Discussing the U.S. 
Constitution, Michelman asks: 
 
What can we say by way of defining the ‘property’ rights thus safeguarded by 
the Constitution, of describing their scope and content in general? What 
kinds of interests or relations, respecting what kinds of valued objects, fall 
within the category of protected interests or relations that the Constitution 
knows as ‘property’? The constitutional text itself does not begin to answer 
the question.95 
 
 The work of Alexander and Van der Walt suggests that the beginning of an answer 
to the question of the scope of property rights resides in civil and private law 
sources.96 Judges and arbitrators need to leave the constitution or the investment 
treaty and look for the content of private property in the rest of the legal order. Since 
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the IIR is an international legal regime, this poses the important question of which 
civil or private law sources should be applied. The question of the applicable law to 
investment disputes is quite contentious, but it is important to underscore that no 
matter which position we follow, no legal order provides a comprehensive definition 
of the scope of property rights. Sometimes, property rules can seem very precise, as 
in the case of the right to transfer dividends and capital in investment treaties. 
However, even in these cases problems of ambiguity and vagueness can arise (e.g. 
what or how much is a dividend?).  
 
V. The Specification of Foreign Investor Rights and the IIR 
 
The analysis of the previous sections confronts us with the fact that investment 
arbitrators not only protect foreign investment but also have to specify the measure 
of control enjoyed by foreign investors. As Paulson has recently suggested, 
arbitrators need to take sides in issues as significant as ‘the existence of water 
rights.’97 An important difference between investment arbitration and any other form 
of international property litigation is that judges under both the American and the 
European Human Rights Systems count with previous domestic decisions regarding 
the scope of the rights in question. These tribunals can therefore rely on (or disagree 
with) these decisions. This is rarely the case in investment arbitration, and arbitrators 
therefore often have to engage with the interpretation of foreign investor rights from 
scratch. The situation of arbitrators, then, differs in very little from that of domestic 
judges. They have to ‘make the implicit rules explicit, to clarify them.’98 There is wide 
consensus in U.S. American Constitutional Property Law, for instance, that the 
judicial interpretation and specification of property rights is a necessary and crucial 
step to resolve a takings case.99 As Rose explains, we 
 
can only claim that you should be compensated for adverse effects to 
something that is within your property right. One might start, then, with the 
question, What ‘takes’ your property? But simply by looking at some cases, 
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one quickly arrives at a more general question, namely, What does your 
property right include?100 
 
 The premise that investment arbitration is key to understanding the scope of 
foreign investor rights seems to have been overlooked by important scholars in 
international investment law. In spite of some early comparative work on the IIR 
and U.S. Constitutional Property Law, particularly within NAFTA, most of the 
literature has followed a quite different path.101 Investment arbitration is said to be 
essential to the enforcement of investment protection but there is little 
consideration, if any, of the consequences that arbitral interpretation has on foreign 
investor rights.102 Orrego Vicuña explains that the evolution of the law of 
investments ‘is not so much related to the nature of the rights but to the role of the 
individual in the international legal system.’103 Douglas points out that ‘[t]he most 
important thing here is, who interprets, not what is interpreted.’104 For him, the IIR is 
a sub-system of international state responsibility.105 More specifically, McLachlan sees 
the objective of treaty framers as being ‘to enhance the mechanisms for the 
protection of rights, rather than to extend the rights themselves.’106 
 This emphasis on the remedy, however, overlooks the most important legal realist 
lesson regarding the relation between rights and remedies. It is true that foreign 
investor rights are meaningless without an efficient mechanism of enforcement. Yet, 
it is also true that the measure of foreign investor control over resources depends on 
arbitral interpretation because in terms of ‘what can be done,’ as Llewellyn taught us, 
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‘[n]ot only ‘no remedy no right,’ but ‘precisely as much right as remedy.’107 
Investment awards resolving concrete disputes between foreign investors and host 
states are in this way ‘devices for generating or specifying the content or meaning of 
such rights.’108 In his work on constitutional rights, Levinson highlights the 
importance of remedies for the scope of rights in the context of constitutional 
adjudication. He claims that ‘[r]ights are dependent on remedies not just for their 
application to the real world, but for their scope, shape, and very existence.’109 Thus, 
the main problem with a view that overlooks the effects of the available remedies on 
foreign investor rights is that ‘one way we understand the meaning and content of a 
right is by looking at how we protect it.’110   
 In this regard, it is important to distinguish the scope of foreign investor rights 
from the debate regarding whether foreign investors exercise investment protection 
as right-holders, beneficiaries or agents, as it has been recently put by Paparinskis.111 
This debate is highly relevant to decide questions such as countermeasures and 
waivers.112 However, the record of investment disputes shows that this is not the 
question Rose is referring to in her work, and, as Crawford notes, ‘in the majority of 
the cases it will make no difference to the result.’113 To the contrary, the 
determination of the scope of foreign investor rights is central to any investment 
dispute because no investor can claim that a host state has taken or affected a right 
or interest he never owned, and no tribunal can order a compensation without 
showing a correlation between the deprivation of economic rights and the amount of 
damages (except, arguably, in the case of moral damages).114 
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 Most investment law literature addresses the scope of foreign investor rights by 
looking for the applicable laws to the rights at stake. The premise appears to be that 
finding the appropriate laws provides an answer to the content of the rights. The 
relevance of domestic laws in investment disputes remains a controversial topic, but 
presently many authors recognise the role that these laws play in the specification of 
foreign investor rights. They distinguish the applicable law to decide on host state 
liability from the law that determines the scope of foreign investor rights. 115 Douglas 
is one of the first authors who advanced the thesis that it is necessary to distinguish 
between the law applicable to the rights comprising the investment and the law 
applicable to the behaviour of the host state in relation to those rights. He considers 
that foreign investor rights are essentially proprietary and, following accepted conflict 
of law rules, the law of the host state should apply to define their scope. Regarding 
host state behaviour, he notes that the challenged measure or conduct should be 
assessed according to investment treaties and international law.116 This reasoning is 
unquestionable from the point of view of conflict of law rules. The content of 
foreign investor rights is essentially a matter of the lex rei sitae.117  
 What this view disregards is that ownership is inherently incomplete in every legal 
order, and that, unless the concrete issue is clarified in a contractual commitment or 
a vested right, it requires judicial or arbitral interpretation. In his work, Douglas 
neither acknowledges this issue nor concentrates on how investment arbitrators 
specify foreign investor rights when domestic laws are incomplete. Unfortunately, 
Douglas does not consider this point further and does not elaborate on the fact 
that—according to investment awards and his own work—the existence and content 
of foreign investor legitimate expectations are governed by the investment treaty and 
international law.118  
 The solution to the problem of foreign investor rights thus is found not only on 
domestic laws but also on the doctrine of legitimate expectations. What is at stake 
with the application of this doctrine emerges from Nikken’s separate opinion in Suez 
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v Argentina (2010). In his decision, this arbitrator made the thought-provoking point 
that the standards included in BITs (he refers in particular to FET) should be 
characterized as liability standards only.119 He argues that FET ‘could never lose its 
essence as a standard of conduct or conduct of the State with respect to foreign 
investments, which should not automatically translate into a source of subjective 
rights for investors.’120 Nikken asserts that the Vienna Convention of the Law of 
Treaties does not support the incorporation of the doctrine of legitimate 
expectations.121 In his view, BITs never mention the doctrine of legitimate 
expectations,122 and this silence is consistent with the object of these treaties, which 
is to protect and promote foreign investment.123 In addition, Nikken provides a 
historical account of the minimum standard of treatment, presenting this standard as 
a liability rule only.124 For these reasons, he finds that ‘BITs contain a list of the 
States’ obligations regarding their respective investments, not a declaration of rights 
for investors,’125 concluding therefore that the doctrine of legitimate expectations 
does not arise from investment treaties.126 
 The doctrine of legitimate expectations may be subject to important criticism, as I 
have argued elsewhere,127 but Nikken’s position ignores that analytically investment 
arbitration cannot be about determining liability only. Nikken overlooks the point 
made by Rose, i.e. that any adjudicator facing a takings dispute first needs to 
determine the scope of the rights allegedly taken. Investment disputes are not only 
about what host states have done but also about, for instance, whether the foreign 
investor has a permit or an entitlement to a permit. This question was essential in 
TECMED v Mexico (2003), and one could even wonder whether it was a critical issue 
to decide the dispute.128 In addition, Nikken disregards that international judges and 
arbitrators have always dealt with the substance of foreign investor rights, whether 
through the acquired rights or the legitimate expectations doctrines.  
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 For a long part of the 20th century the acquired rights doctrine, sometimes referred 
to as vested rights doctrine, was a central concept for tribunals and scholars dealing 
with the protection of alien property according to international law. In 1926, the 
PCIJ declared that ‘the principle of respect of vested rights forms part of generally 
accepted international law.’129 More than sixty years later, little seemed to have 
changed. In 1988, Asante affirmed that ‘[t]he fundamental premise for the 
international minimum standard governing the treatment of foreign property is 
respect for acquired rights.’130 According to the literature, the essential purpose of 
this doctrine was to protect the content of foreigners’ rights in accordance with 
domestic law. Cheng explains that ‘[t]he effect of this principle of respect for 
acquired rights is that rights of foreigners which are created under or recognised by 
the territorial law may not be abrogated unless in virtue of a permissible rule of 
international law.’131 Bouchard similarly concludes that ‘the primary source of the 
alien’s rights [was] municipal law.’132 
 In his Fourth Report on State Responsibility, García Amador recognizes the 
importance of the acquired rights doctrine but also notes that a problem with the 
application of this doctrine is the determination of the scope of protection, and the 
nature and content of the acquired rights.133 This problem emerges quite clearly from 
the decision in the Oscar Chinn case (1937), where a central issue to be decided by the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) was precisely the scope of foreign 
investor ownership. In this case, the court was  
 
unable to see in his original position—which was characterized by the 
possession of customers and the possibility of making a profit—anything in 
the nature of a genuine vested right. Favourable business conditions and 
goodwill are transient circumstances, subject to inevitable changes.134 
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This decision could be the result of the mere application of domestic or international 
laws. As García Amador explains, the content of foreign investor rights can be found 
in host state laws or, when they exist, in any contractual commitment, permit or 
license regarding the control of the resources comprising the foreign investment.135 
Nonetheless, a closer look at this decision shows that the outcome was mainly a 
question of interpretation of Oscar Chinn’s rights. The doctrine of acquired rights 
was internationally recognised during a period in which most states behaved ‘more 
or less in conformity with the principles derived from the conception of the liberal 
capitalist state.’136 By 1937, however, the lax application of this doctrine appears 
more in line with the legal developments following the Great Depression: i.e., more 
state intervention in economic affairs.137 
 It could be argued that this observation on the acquired rights doctrine is no longer 
relevant to the IIR since few if any investment tribunal uses this concept. Yet, there 
is something that connects acquired rights with legitimate expectations: these two 
interpretative formulas serve to specify the scope of foreign investor rights. In this 
respect, Gaillard is of the opinion that legitimate expectations have replaced acquired 
rights in the reasoning of investment arbitrators. He claims that: 
 
The expectation of investors—or, in a context where the plural would appear 
to give more strength to the formula, ‘the expectations’ of investors—seem 
to be the cornerstone of the whole system. At the beginning of the 21st 
century, the expectation of investors thus seems to represent a magic formula 
similar to that used to express the notion of ‘acquired rights’ at the beginning 
of the 20th century.138 
 
This conclusion has also been reached by other authors. Von Walter affirms that the 
‘scope and the extent of the rights associated with an investment may also depend, at 
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least in part, on the legitimate expectations of the investor.’139 Grigera Naón similarly 
explains in his dissenting opinion in EnCana Corporation v Ecuador (2005) that ‘[s]uch 
expectations constitute an interest that, because having an economic, and even 
pecuniary, value is a form of ownership (or derecho de propiedad) under the Treaty.’140 
Lastly, the works of Wälde and Kolo, and Fortier and Drymer describe the legitimate 
expectations doctrine along the same functional lines of the acquired rights doctrine, 
i.e. as a formula to specify the scope of foreign investor rights.141 
 A look at investment awards illustrates the role of investment arbitrators in 
determining the scope of foreign investor rights through the legitimate expectations 
doctrine. Referring to CME v the Czech Republic (2001), for instance, Wälde highlights 
that for that tribunal ‘CME had a legitimate expectation that its legal position 
recognized by the Czech regulator would be maintained and not changed without 
bona ‘fide’ purpose, to undermine its business, in particular favouring domestic 
investors.’142 The tribunal in this arbitration recognized that the foreign investor had 
a right to an exclusive position. Arguably, this issue was central to the dispute 
because with no such a right the conduct of the Czech Republic would have been 
less arbitrary or even legitimate. The award in Merrill v Canada (2010) also illustrates 
this point as the arbitrators had to decide whether the foreign investor had an 
expectation of exporting his production or enjoying the export/market price.143 
Again, the decision in Merrill v Canada was in favour of Canada plausibly because the 
arbitrators found that the foreign investor had no right to enjoy the export price. 
Moreover, a debate about the scope of foreign investors rights is clearly present in 
Lemire v Ukraine (2010), where the two concurring arbitrators found that the foreign 
investor had a legitimate expectation that his business ‘would be allowed to 
expand.’144 Against this basis, they considered whether this entitlement was deprived 
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of by the behaviour of the Ukrainian government.145 The dissenting arbitrator in this 
dispute remarked that a key reason for his dissent was the interpretation of Lemire’s 
rights. For him, this foreign investor never acquired the entitlement in question.146 
 
VI. A Constitutional Property View of Foreign Investor Rights  
 
Overlooking that investment arbitrators play a substantial role in interpreting and 
specifying foreign investor rights may have some implications for the analysis of 
international investment law. The main effect is that part of the investment law 
literature considers foreign investor rights in a formal manner, focusing almost 
exclusively on host state actions. Accordingly, if we can distinguish arbitrary and 
abusive host state behaviour from regular activity, we then solve the conundrum of 
foreign investment disputes.147 This creates in the literature an apparent belief that 
getting the enforcement side of the problem right, e.g. through the application of 
balancing and proportionality, would resolve any issue.148 approach overlooks that 
the responsibility of host states also depends on the way in which investment 
tribunals interpret the rights at stake.149 
 The general lack of interest in foreign investor rights and, in particular, in the way 
investment arbitrators specify the scope of these rights suggests that we are often at 
the risk of falling into a formalist trap. The measure of control over the resources is 
not a natural or trivial question: it is very often a matter of a normative conflict.150 
The incomplete character of ownership often imposes the task of resolving this 
conflict on investment arbitrators. The need to make this type of interpretative 
decisions is common to a constitutional rights framework. As Dworkin remarks, the 
‘characterization of the rights is formal, of course, in the sense that it does not 
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indicate what rights people have or guarantee, indeed, that they have any.’151 Thus, 
the most important feature of a constitutional property regime—and of the IIR—is 
not the provision of clarity regarding the constitutional boundaries of private 
property rights but the security of whatever the judges consider to be property.152 
Only after finding that the state has deprived the individual of their rights, a judge or 
an investment arbitrator may decide to override the state measure because it is 
imbalanced or disproportionate. 
  What is important to underscore then is that the inclusion of a property clause in a 
constitution or the conclusion of an investment treaty may have many consequences; 
however, none of them is the creation of well-defined property rights. The 
constitutional protection of private property, including foreign investment protection 
according to the IIR, does not say much about the scope of the rights. It could be 
possible that the adoption of a constitutional property clause or the conclusion of an 
investment treaty provides the main guidelines for the substantiation of proprietary 
rights. However, each constitutional property regime and the IIR in particular belong 
to a long but also extremely plural and culturally diverse tradition of property 
rights.153 Indeed, although private property can be important for a community, such 
as in the United States, the case law in that country is characterized as a muddle.154 
From this lack of consistent judicial decisions, it is reasonable to anticipate that the 
work of investment arbitrators will not be easy: if the judicial decisions in the United 
States are inconsistent, it is likely that this is the case in most countries and, as the 
practice shows, it is in investment arbitration. In deciding investment disputes, then, 
investment arbitrators cannot follow a clear long-standing body of domestic legal 
antecedents: the reason is that such a body of cases does not exist. 
 In her analysis of takings decisions in the United States, Rose claims that the reason 
for the muddle in takings cases is that judges have resolved the normative conflict 
inherent in property differently.155 Her work shows that the main questions 
concerning expropriation disputes are not doctrinal. This view is shared by Singer, 
for instance, who argues that the substantiation of ownership depends on the 
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normative view about externalities, which historically has been guided by either a 
classical liberal, a legal realist or a law and economics approach.156 Ackerman makes a 
similar claim, noting that ‘it is only after resolving certain philosophical issues that 
one can make sense of the constitutional question, let alone pretend to expound a 
correct constitutional answer.’157 Ackerman’s work on constitutional property starts 
with the premise that judges decide takings cases according to a number of values 
that summarize their ‘comprehensive view’ in relation to private property and the 
legal order.158 He stresses that: 
 
the constitutional text has been conceived as a mandate for the analyst to, 
first, impute a Comprehensive View to the legal system as to determine the 
substantive principles of just compensation and, second, work out those 
compensation rules that will further the Comprehensive View in all litigated 
cases involving the taking of property rights.159 
  
 A main task of investment arbitrators is thus to choose between different 
justifications for private property, such as a Kantian moral rationale or one based on 
Bentham’s utility or Posner’s efficiency.160 This choice is central to the outcome of a 
dispute because it leads the interpreter in quite a clear direction. In a dispute 
regarding public access to a beach, for instance, arbitrators would arguably arrive to 
quite opposite decisions depending on their preference for wealth maximisation 
through foreign investment or the recreation of the local population.161 For this 
reason, limiting the debate about foreign investor rights to the doctrinal contours of 
the doctrine of legitimate expectations, or any other magical formula such as 
acquired rights, equals to overlook the normative side of the debate altogether. The 
discussion remains doctrinal, in this sense, to the extent that it focuses on the 
subjective or objective character of the expectations, or the application of the caveat 
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emptor principle to foreign investors.162 A discussion about the doctrinal boundaries 
of legitimate expectations can not reveal the general lines of the interpretation of 
foreign investor rights because the question investment arbitrators pose, and not 
only the answers they provide, are shaped by the comprehensive view they follow.163 
As Waldron explains, the scope of property rights ‘is not a matter of independent 
choice; it is the upshot of the arguments we are convinced by.’164 
 
VII. Conclusion  
 
This article has shown that foreign investors are concerned about not only the 
protection of private property rights but also the measure of control that these rights 
provide over resources. Thus far, however, the international investment law literature 
has paid limited if any attention to the kind of property rights that come to be 
specified in the context of the IIR. Procedural questions raised by investment 
arbitration have attracted most of the attention, while the analysis of arbitral 
interpretation has been limited to the review of host state authority. Little has been 
said, in favour or against, the scope of foreign investor rights in accordance with 
investment awards. 
 Referring to international investment law as the legal order that protects foreign 
investors from host state abuse or arbitrary behaviour focuses excessively on one 
side of the story, understating the relevance of foreign investor rights. This article 
has argued that control is central in foreign investment relations, and that foreign 
investors are concerned with host state behaviour to the extent that it can affect their 
expectations regarding the use and benefit of resources. This legal realist perspective 
suggests that there is a need to expand the existing approach to the IIR, moving 
from an approach restricted to host state behaviour and responsibility, to a more 
comprehensive view capable of embracing foreign investor rights and standards of 
review. In these terms, the relevant questions are both the specification and 
enforcement of the rights foreign investors enjoy over the resources comprising their 
investments. 
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 A characterisation of the IIR that concentrates on foreign investment protection, 
such as a mechanism of judicial review, overlooks any discussion about the 
interpretation of foreign investor rights. It is unquestionable that host state 
behaviour matters to decide an investment dispute. But looking only at this is not 
enough, and the scope of foreign investor rights is a question of similar importance 
and complexity. In this regard, it could well be that the present academic efforts to 
balance the IIR require focusing not only on where investment arbitrators should 
draw the line between legitimate and illegitimate host state behaviour, but also on 
how they interpret and specify foreign investor rights. Arguably, a more profound 
debate about the interpretation and specification of foreign investor rights could 
shift the interest of the literature towards the justifications for these rights, the 
comprehensive view that guide investment arbitrators, and the plural character of 
property. This discussion would inevitably lead the present debate towards property 
law and theory, opening a space for debate and change in the international regulation 
of foreign investment. Such a move can only be salutary in times when the IIR is 
facing increasing discontent. 
